Résumé du projet de recherche (Langue 1)

The main objective of the patent system is to provide rewards for socially beneficial innovations (Gilbert and Shapiro (1990)). Patents are traditionally regarded as necessary evils: the system is costly, granting what is often perceived as excessive market power as a reward to innovation, but, given the asymmetries of information involved, i.e. the fact that beforehand it is very hard to elicit the information over which innovations are truly valuable, they are still seen as the best way of providing the right incentives for research and development. Other factors come into play as forces pushing away from the social optimum; as the design of patent systems does not account for differences in industries and its one-size-fits-all may distort firms R&D effort to favor products with a short time between patenting and commercialization or lead to strategic choice of R&D by firms in order to explore patents as a way to create barriers to entry. It’s a common claim that the lower the quality of patents issued (e.g., when patents that cover already existing technologies or obvious ones), the less efficient is the patent system at stimulating innovation. Complaints about patent quality are not new and seem to be increasing in recent years. With a consistent rise in the number of patents being granted, these problems are likely to be intensified. This research project aims at investigating how these effects interact in markets where several patents are required in order to produce a single product, filling the gap between the literature streams on optimal patent duration, patenting and anti-trust, and patent pools and standard setting.

Informations complémentaires (Langue 1)

The PhD student will present his research in the international conferences of the field (in industrial organization and economics of innovation and intellectual property).